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THE 1979 UNITED STATES-IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS REVIEWED
FROM AN ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
MUHAMMAD-BASHEER .A. ISMAIL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all Muslim states' signed and ratified the two international diplomatic
and consular legal frameworks: the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations ("VCDR") 2 and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
("VCCR").3 The Islamic Republic of Iran, a party to the VCDR and the VCCR, is
expected to uphold these conventional principles of diplomatic immunities and
international law in all its diplomatic interactions with other states. Three decades
ago, the Islamic Republic of Iran seized the United States of America's embassy
and its staff. The United States brought a case against Iran in the International
Court of Justice ("I.C.J") for violating diplomatic immunity and international
obligations. Although the Iranian government was not represented throughout the
proceedings before the I.C.J., it sent, through the Iranian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, two letters dated December 9, 1979, and March 16, 1980, to the I.C.J.4
These letters summarized the reasons why the Iranian government felt that the case
brought by the United States should not be recognized and considered by the
*Muhammad-Basheer A. Ismail has a PhD in Law from the University of Hull, England, and a
Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. This article is an excerpt from his doctoral
thesis completed under the supervisions of Dr. Niaz A. Shah and Dr. Richard Burchill of the School of
Law, University of Hull, England. The author is greatly indebted to them for their constructive and
helpful observations. The author is also grateful to Dr. Lateef Adetona for his invaluable comments and
Mr. Feisal Fara, a PhD candidate at the University of Hull, for his useful remarks. I am equally thankful
to Laura Wood for her editorial comments and observations.
1. "Muslim state" in this article refers to country that has a majority Muslim population. It also
includes states that specifically declare themselves as "Islamic Republics" and those states that declare
Islam, in their Constitutions, as the state's religion. It must be noted, however, that the meaning of
"Muslim states" does not necessarily cover all the 57 states that are members of the Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation ("OIC"), because there are some member states such as Togo, Uganda, Republic of
Benin, Gabon, Mozambique, and Suriname that cannot be said to have majority Muslim population. See
MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 8 (2003); see also HASAN
MOINUDDIN, THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER STATES 10-12 (1987).
2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force Apr. 24, 1964) [hereinafter VCDR].
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
(entered into force Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter VCCR].
4. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980
I.C.J. 3, $ 10 (May 24).
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I.C.J.5 After considering the facts of the case and all the evidence adduced, the
I.C.J. found the Iranian government guilty.6 The judgment of the I.C.J. would have
been more convincing to the Islamic Republic of Iran had the United States further
predicated its arguments on Islamic law.
Considering this background, it may be necessary to reappraise the 1979
seizure of the American embassy in Tehran by examining Islamic law's
implication on the entire incidence. The purpose is to ascertain whether the Iranian
authorities made adequate provisions for the protection of the American diplomatic
personnel within the territory of Iran in accordance with Islamic siyar, otherwise
known as Islamic international law.7 It is crucial to mention here, that not much
has been mentioned concerning the position of Islamic siyar on the 1979 Iranian
invasion of the United States embassy. The only major work that was written in
respect of the position of Islamic law concerning the Iranian invasion of the United
States embassy in 1979 was by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni in 1980 while the
invasion of the embassy was still ongoing.8 This article will, therefore, be
evaluating facts surrounding i) the seizure of the embassy and the hostage taking
crisis; ii) the applicable international conventions between Iran and the United
States and their legal implications under Islamic siyar; iii) the justification for
detaining the United States diplomats, if any, under Islamic siyar; iv) the violation
of diplomatic immunity under Islamic siyar; and, v) the implication of Iran's
violation of the United States diplomatic immunity under Islamic international law.
This article then concludes that the general finding of Islamic siyar with regards to
the Iranian hostage case may not be different from that of the findings of the I.C.J.
II. SEIZURE OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY
On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian Muslim students, known as the
Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy,9 invaded the American embassy
in Tehran and held fifty-two of its personnel hostage for 444 days. The action of
the students was said to be in protest against the decision of the United States in
October 1979 to admit the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, into the
United States under the pretext of a life-saving medical treatment.10 The hostage
takers threatened that unless the Shah was extradited along with his wealth, they
5. See id.; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 1 8 (Dec. 15).
6. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 195.
7. The word 'siyar' has been used as a rough equivalent of Islamic international law. THE
OxFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 297 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003). It is generally used by jurists to mean
the conduct of state relationship with other communities and nations. Id. Islamic international law and
Islamic siyar will be used interchangeably in this article.
8. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 609,
609, 618-20 (1980).
9. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 119 (3rd rev. ed.
1988).
10. Amir Rafat, The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran, 10 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
425,426 (1981).
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would not hesitate to put the hostages on trial for the offense of espionage." But
the fact remained that under Section 3181(a) of the United States Code, the United
States would not have extradited the Shah due to the absence of any extradition
treaty with the Islamic Republic of Iran.12 That being the case, the United States
was legally incapable of extraditing the Shah of Iran. Aside from the thirteen
female and African-American hostages that were released within the first month,'3
and later another hostage that was released due to illness,14 the rest of the members
of the diplomatic and consular staff of the United States were not released until
January 20, 1981.'s
The United States made "innumerable pleas, resolutions, declarations, special
missions, and even sanctions" towards securing the release of the hostages without
success.16  The United States then instituted a legal action against the Islamic
Republic of Iran at the I.C.J., the judicial arm of the United Nations, on November
29, 1979.'1 The I.C.J., in its unanimous decision on December 15, 1979, gave an
interim order directing Iran to restore the diplomatic mission to the United States
government and to release the hostages by giving them full diplomatic protection
with freedom to leave Iran. ' On May 24, 1980, the I.C.J. issued its final judgment
on the merits and found Iran to be in contravention to its obligations under
international conventions and long-established rules of general international law.19
The Islamic Republic of Iran was also ordered to make reparation to the United
States.20 Both the interim order and the final judgment of the I.C.J. were defied by
Iran.21
It is important to mention that throughout the entire proceedings at the I.C.J.,
the United States hinged their legal arguments mainly on well-acknowledged
11. Id. at 427-28.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012); see Richard Falk, Editorial, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 411, 411-12 (1980).
13. It was reported that a woman and two African-American men were released on November 18,
1979. Jonathan C. Randal, Iran Releases 10 More U.S. Hostages, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1979, at Al.
Another four white females and six African-American male hostages were released on November 19,
1979. Id.
14. Paul Lewis, Richard I. Queen, 51, Hostage Freed Early by Iranians in '80, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
21, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/21/us/richard-i-queen-51-hostage-freed-early-by-iranians-
in-80.html.
15. William Branigin, Ordeal Ends on 444th Day, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1981, at Al.
16. L.H. Legault, Hostage-Taking and Diplomatic Immunity, 11 MAN. L.J. 359, 359 (1981).
17. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
1 (May 24). See also Don Oberdorfer, U.S. Takes Case to World Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1979,
at Al.
18. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7,147 (Dec. 15) (granting provisional measures).
19. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 90.
20. Id. 95.
21. Id. 75. See also JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF
INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 120 (1983).
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principles of diplomatic immunity, 22 which are viewed and understood from the
Western legal perspective. The United States could have further argued from the
viewpoint of Islamic law by relying on the Qur'anic, prophetic, and various
Muslim juristic pronouncements on the principles of diplomatic immunity. Such
arguments would have strengthened the United States case against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Judge Weeramantry rightly argues that Islamic international law,
which is equally "rich in principles relating to the treatment of foreign embassies
and personnel," would possibly have had a three-fold effect on Iran if the United
States had availed itself the opportunity of canvassing it before the Justices of the
I.C.J.23 The three-fold effect, according to Weeramantry, is that "[1] its persuasive
value would have been immensely greater; [2] it would have shown an
appreciation and an understanding of Islamic culture; and [3] it would have
induced a greater readiness on the Iranian side to negotiate from a base of common
understanding."24
We must also not forget the general references made by two of the Judges of
the I.C.J. (Judge Waldock and Judge Tarazi) to the contribution of Islamic
jurisprudence to the body of diplomatic immunity and inviolability. In his view,
Judge Waldock, in the lead judgment, maintains "the principle of the inviolability
of the persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one
of the very foundations of this long-established regime, to the evolution of which
the traditions of Islam made a substantial contribution." 25 Similarly, Judge Tarazi,
while delivering a dissenting opinion, cited with approval a 1937 lecture delivered
by Professor Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty, confirming the respect
conferred on diplomatic personnel under Islamic law, when Professor Rechid says
that "[i]n Arabia, the person of the Ambassador has always been regarded as
sacred. Muhammad consecrated this inviolability. Never were ambassadors to
Muhammad or to his successors molested." 26
The Iranian authority, particularly, Imam Ayatollah Khomeini 27 has been
generally accused of backing and directly endorsing the entire actions of the
students regarding the seizure of the United States embassy. 28 Not only did the
Iranian government cooperate with the student demonstrators by not preventing
them from invading the United States embassy, it also gave a mark of approval to
and showered an unconditional encomium on the hostage takers.29 A
representative of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, for example, was recalled as saying
22. Memorial of United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 121, at 124 (Jan. 12, 1980).
23. C. G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 166
(1988).
24. Id.
25. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 186.
26. Id. at 59 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tarazi).
27. Ayatollah Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a position he
held until his death on June 3, 1989. Patrick E. Tyler, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini is Dead, WASH. POST,
June 4, 1989, at Al.
28. Rafat, supra note 10, at 427.
29. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 71.
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that "[t]oday's move by a group of our compatriots is a natural reaction to the
United States government's indifference to the hurt feelings of the Iranian people
about the presence of the deposed Shah, who is in the United States under the
pretext of illness."30 He further said that "[i]f the U.S. authorities respected the
feelings of the Iranian people and understood the depth of the Iranian revolution,
they should have at least not allowed the deposed Shah into the country and should
have returned his property."31 A pronouncement attributed to the then Iranian
Foreign Minister, Mr. Ibrahim Yazdi, that the students' action "enjoys the
endorsement and support of the government, because America herself is
responsible for this incident," was also regarded as a general ratification of the
entire hostage crisis.32
The then-President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, decided to explore the
possibility of resolving the imbroglio through diplomatic process by instructing his
Attorney-General, Ramsey Clark, accompanied by the chief counsel for the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, William Miller, to go and deliver a message to
Imam Ayatollah Khomeini requesting the release of the hostages. 33  Imam
Khomeini and members of the Revolutionary Council refused to meet with the
envoys sent by the United States. While Clark was en route, Tehran Radio
broadcasted the speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini on November 7, 1979,
forbidding any member of the Revolutionary Council from holding any discussion
with the two emissaries from the United States, while also maintaining that:
the U.S. embassy in Iran is our enemies' centre of espionage against our
sacred Islamic movement ... Should the United States hand over to Iran
the deposed shah . . . and give up espionage against our movement, the
way to talks would be opened on the issue of certain relations which are
in the interest of the nation. 34
The major position of the Iranian government, which explains the approval of
the students' seizure of the United States embassy was Imam Khomeini's vital
remark that "those people who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that
place do not enjoy international diplomatic respect."35  Imam Khomeini's
declaration that "[tihe noble Iranian nation will not give permission for the release
30. Tehran Students Seize U.S Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1979, at Al.
3 1. Id.
32. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 170.
33. LUCIEN S. VANDENBROUCKE, PERILOUS OPTIONS: SPECIAL OPERATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 116-17 (1993). The choice of Clark may not be unconnected to the fact that he
happened to be a relentless critic of the former Shah of Iran and more so, he was known to have
indicated his support for the Islamic revolution during his meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini while he
(Khomeini) was in exile. Id.; see also JAMES A. PHILLIPS, IRAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
HOSTAGES: AFTER 300 DAYS 13 (1980), available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf media/1980/pdf/bgl26.pdf. According to James A. Phillips, a policy
analyst, the U.S. rested their trust on the "anti-Shah credentials of these two liberals [Clark and Miller]"
whom they thought could give them credibility by having the crisis resolved through diplomatic means.
PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 13.
34. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 1 26.
35. Id. 73.
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of the rest of [the hostages]. Therefore, the rest of [the hostages] will be under
arrest until the American government acts according to the wish of the nation,"36
depicted, in an obvious fashion, the lucid intent of the Iranian government in
ratifying the acts perpetrated by the Iranian demonstrators.
The likely legal implication of the Iranian official statements in this scenario
is that hostage takers are agents of Iranian authority. It would seem difficult for
the Iranian government to claim lack of responsibility just because it did not
officially carry out or direct the seizure of the United States embassy and the
detention of its personnel. The Iranian authorities can, at best, be described
according to the remark of Professor Rafat as "wholehearted participants in the
violation of international law that had occurred."37 According to a principle laid
down in Islamic law, an act may be deemed validly constituted by an unauthorized
agent, provided that such an act is eventually ratified by the principal.38 This
follows the legal maxim that says "[s]ubsequent ratification has the same effect as
a previous authorization to act as an agent."39 Therefore, it would not be out of
place for the Iranian government to take responsibility for the acts perpetrated by
the Iranian demonstrators based on the various pronouncements made by the
Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and other government officials.
III. THE IRANIAN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States mutually agreed to abide
by international obligations to respect and protect diplomatic missions. These
international obligations are variously contained in the VCDR; 40 VCCR;4 1 the
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; 42 and the 1955
36. Id.
37. Rafat, supra note 10, at 427.
38. See MUHAMMAD AYUB, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC FINANCE 348 (2007).
39. LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 187 (Majid
Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., The Lawbook Exchange, LTD. 2008) (1955) (footnote omitted).
40. VCDR, supra note 2. The VCDR was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 3,
1965, and also ratified by the United States of America on November 13, 1972. United Nations,
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Apr. 18, 1961), https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=III-
3&chapter-=3&lang-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
41. VCCR, supra note 3. The VCCR was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 5, 1975,
and also ratified by the United States of America on November 24, 1969. United Nations, Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Apr. 24,
1963), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLiNE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=iii-
6&chapter-3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
42. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. This
Convention was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran on July 12, 1978, and also ratified by the
United States of America on October 26, 1976. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (Dec. 14, 1973),
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Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United
States and Iran.43 Sovereign nations have been able to interact peacefully and
maintain regular connection among themselves due to the age-long international
legal method in the form of treaties and covenants. The United States alleged that
the Islamic Republic of Iran was in gross violation of international obligations
stipulated in these treaties by failing to safeguard and protect the safety and
inviolability of the United States diplomatic mission and personnel in Iran." In
other words, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have unanimously
agreed to respect and discharge the following obligations:
a. Protect the inviolability of the diplomatic premises and the
correspondence and archives; 45
b. Safeguard the inviolability of diplomats and protect them from arrest
and detention;46
c. Guarantee diplomatic and consular immunity from criminal
prosecution;47
d. Ensure immunity from criminal prosecution of the administrative and
technical personnel of the mission;48
e. Guarantee the freedom of movement of the diplomatic and consular
staff;49
f. Co-operate in the prevention of crimes against internationally protected
persons;50 and,
g. Give the most constant protection and security to the nationals of the
United States and their consular representatives within the territory of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno-XVIII-
7&chapter-I8&lang-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
43. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8
U.S.T. 900, 284 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force June 16, 1957) [hereinafter 1955 Treaty of Amity].
44. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
18 (May 24). See also Rafat, supra note 10, at 425-426.
45. VCDR, supra note 2, arts. 22, 24, 27; VCCR, supra note 3, arts. 31, 33.
46. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 29; VCCR, supra note 3, art. 40.
47. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 31; VCCR, supra note 3, art. 43; 1955 Treaty of Amity, supra note
43, art. XVIII.
48. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 37.
49. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 26; Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 34, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325,
596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967). This Optional Protocol has been ratified by
Islamic Republic of Iran on June 5, 1975, and initially ratified by the United States of America on
November 24, 1969, however, it withdrew its ratification on March 7, 2005. United Nations,
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Apr. 24, 1963),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=III-8&chapter=3&lang-en
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (while the United States has withdrawn from the treaty, it was in force during
the relevant time of the conflict of which this article is focused).
50. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 42, arts. 2, 4, 7.
2013 25
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
In addition to its obligations under international law, the Islamic Republic of
Iran cannot pretend to be oblivious to the significance of covenants in Islamic
jurisprudence. Even though Iran is known to have an overwhelming majority
following the Shi'a Imamiyyah sect of Islam,52 the fact remains true that in the
Sunni53 and Shi'a schools of law, the religious importance and the legal binding
nature of international treaties (known within Islamic legal parlance as mu 'ahadat)
are well pronounced.54 Islamic jurisprudence attaches great value to the concept of
agreements. Contracts, in Islamic law, are not only considered legally binding,
they are equally held with great sense of religiosity. The maxim "Al Muslimun
'inda shurfitihim (Muslims are bound by their stipulations)" is generally accepted
as traditional rule of Islamic jurisprudence by all the madhahib-Muslim schools
of law.ss In Islamic law, a binding contract could be in the form of an individual's
obligation to Allah; a contract of marriage between two parties of opposite sexes; a
political arrangement which encompasses treaty obligations between two or more
states; or a commercial contract. 56 They are generally considered agreements, or
pacts, which must be fulfilled once entered into either individually or
collectively.57
An agreement, be it between an individual Muslim and the Muslim state or
between a Muslim state and a non-Muslim state, remains sacrosanct. The Imam of
a Muslim state is particularly under a duty to discharge his covenants to the
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.5 8  According to the tradition of Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) quoted by the Hanbali jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), that:
For everyone who has committed a breach of faith there shall be a flag
[of disgrace]. On the day of judgment it will be hoisted. Its height will
51. 1955 Treaty of Amity, supra note 43, art. 1(4).
52. The Shi'a Imamiyyah otherwise known as al-Ithna-Ashariyyah, the Twelvers, is the
predominant sect in the Islamic Republic of Iran, although there are numerous denominations within the
Shi 'a sect. See Shahrough Akhavi, Shiite Theories ofSocial Contract, in SHARI'A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 137, 139-40,143-46 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007).
53. The Sunni, otherwise known as ahlu-sunnah wal-jama'ah, which means the people of the
tradition of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the consensus of the ummah, forms the largest group in
Islam. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 306 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003).
54. See LABEEB AHMED BSOUL, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (MU'.iHADA T) IN ISLAM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (SIYAR) ACCORDING TO ORTHODOX
SCHOOLS 107-112 (2008). See also Saba Habachy, Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 450, 452 (1962); Muhammad-Basheer Adisa Ismail, Islamic Diplomatic Law and
International Diplomatic Law: A Quest for Compatibility, at 263 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Hull), available at https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/assets/hull:7135a/content [hereinafter
Ismail, Islamic Diplomatic Law and International Diplomatic Law].
55. Habachy, supra note 54, at 459.
56. Noor Mohammed, Principles of Islamic Contract Law, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW:
FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY 95, 96 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006).
57. See id.
58. Habachy, supra note 54, at 451. "The duty of loyalty and respect for contract weighs more
heavily on the Imam and on everyone who wields authority in the Muslim community than it does on an
ordinary individual." Id. at 463.
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be in proportion to the enormity of his breach of faith. No breacher of
faith is more unjust than an amir [prince] who breaks his covenant.s9
In fact, a Muslim state is expected to be a model for its citizens in discharging
all contractual obligations it has granted to any foreign country.60
Generally, in Islamic law, a covenant has its authority rooted in the two prime
sources of Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur'an and Sunnah.6 1 When the Qur'an says:
"0 you who have believed, fulfill [all] contracts,"62 it is generally understood that
it incorporates all forms of obligations, contracts, and covenants that are made
between man and man and "spiritual covenants between man and God."6 1
Particularly relevant to this discussion is the verse of the Qur'an that categorically
forbids any violation of treaties between Muslims and non-Muslims. "Exempted
are those with whom you made a treaty among the polytheists and then they have
not been deficient toward you in anything or supported anyone against you; so
complete for them their treaty until their term [has ended]. Indeed, Allah loves the
righteous [who fear Him]."6 This means that if non-Muslims remain faithful and
do not breach their covenants, then, Muslims are duty bound to respect the terms of
the agreements until their expiration. Allah is very clear in describing those who
violate covenants as those who are faithless. 65
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was recorded to have entered into a treaty with
the non-Muslims of Makkah, which was known as the Treaty ofHudaybiyyah (AD
628), and he tenaciously observed the terms of the treaty to the letter.66  That
treaty, according to Muslim jurists, later became a paradigm that authenticates the
validity of all forms of legal instruments between the Muslim and non-Muslim
states.67 In the same vein, there are numerous statements by Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) giving authority to the validity of covenants and treaties in Islamic law,
especially if such treaties do not jeopardize the interest of the Muslims or contain
59. Id. at 463 (footnote omitted) (quoting the Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah).
60. See id. at 451.
61. The Sunnah, being the second source of Islamic law, is the Prophetic traditions and constitutes
the sayings, actions, and tacit approval of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
ISLAM 305 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003).
62. Qur'an 5:1.
63. J. N. D. Anderson & N. J. Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, 33
N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923 (1958). See also P. Nicholas Kourides, Comment, The Influence of Islamic
Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems: The Formation and Binding Force of Contracts,
9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384, 394 (1970).
64. Qur'an 9:4.
65. See Qur'an 2:100 ("Is it not [true] that every time they took a covenant a party of them threw
it away? But, [in fact], most of them do not believe.").
66. This treaty, otherwise known as 'Sulh al-Hudaybiyyah,' was signed in March AD 628 at a
place called al-Hudaybiyyah, which was on the edge of the sacred territory of Makkah. See W.
MONTGOMERY WATT, MUHAMMAD AT MEDINA 46-52 (1956).
67. See GENE W. HECK, WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: EXPLORING THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 170 (2007).
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any stipulations that run contrary to the Islamic teachings. 68 In fact, Islamic law
will encourage a Muslim ruler or any of his representatives not to hesitate in
concluding an agreement once such an agreement neither negates Islamic teachings
nor is inimical to the general interests of the Muslims.69  Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) is reported to have said that "The Muslims are bound by their obligations,
except an obligation that renders the lawful unlawful, and the unlawful lawful."70
It is considered sacrilegious for a Muslim to violate a treaty or a term in a treaty
once it has been agreed upon, regardless of whether the other party is a non-
Muslimi' 1 Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was very blunt in informing Abu Jandal
that "[w]e have entered with the Quraysh into a treaty of peace and we have
exchanged with them a solemn pledge that none will cheat the other" 72 when he
requested to join the Muslims in Madinah immediately after signing the famous
Treaty of Hudaybiyyah in AD 628.73
In a similar vein, the third Caliph in Islam, Uthman Ibn 'Affan (d. AD 656),
was said to have entered into a treaty with the people of Nubia promising not to
wage war against them or attack them on basis of the treaty that binds the two of
them.74 The Caliph was reported to stand firmly by the terms of the treaty.
It is not in doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran, being a signatory to all
these treaties, is legally committed and intended to observe the terms of the
treaties. It will also be right to assume that the objects and terms of these treaties
are not in any way contradictory to the core objectives of the Shari'ah (maqasid al-
shari'ah).n In other words, these treaties, both under conventional international
law and Islamic international law, must be observed to the letter since they have
68. See Wilson B. Bishai, Negotiations and Peace Agreements Between Muslims and Non-
Muslims in Islamic History, in MEDIEVAL AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 50, 51-54 (Sami A. Hanna
ed., 1972).
69. Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, Islamic Diplomacy: Views of the Classical Jurists, in ISLAM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENGAGING SELF-CENTRISM FROM A PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVES 127, 134
(Marie-Luisa Frick & Andreas Th. Muller eds., 2013).
70. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE SHARI'A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN TIME OF WAR AND
PEACE 153-54 (2014) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, SHARI'A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].
71. Habachy, supra note 54, at 460.
72. MUHAMMAD HUSAYN HAYKAL, THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD 354 (Isma'TI Rdj! A. al Fariqi
trans., 8th ed. 1976).
73. It is the treaty that was signed between the state of Madinah as represented by Prophet
Muhammad on the one hand and the Quraysh tribe of Makkah as represented by Suhayl bin 'Amr on
the other hand. See WATT, supra note 66, at 46-52 (it is also known as 'Sulh al-Hudaybiyyah').
74. M. H. HAMIDULLAH, MUSLIM CONDUCT OF STATE 291-92 (2d ed. 1945).
75. See 13 THE HISTORY OF AL-TABART: THE CONQUEST OF IRAQ, SOUTHERN PERSIA AND EGYPT
175-76 (Gautier H.A. Juynboll trans., 1989).
76. See generally supra notes 40-43.
77. The primary purposes and objectives of Islamic law, which must remain preserved, according
to the Muslim jurists, are: religion (ad-din), life (an-nafs), progeny (an-nasl), intellect (al-'aql), and
wealth (al-mal). M. UMER CHAPRA, THE FUTURE OF ECONOMICS: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 118
(2000). These objectives are meant to "promote the well-being of all mankind" and "[w]hatever ensures
the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is desirable." Id.
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become applicable in themselves. The failure of the Iranian government to
provide adequate security to the United States embassy and its personnel,
especially on November 4, 1979, when the latter desperately needed it from the
incursion of the demonstrators, definitely constituted a breach of these
international obligations both under Islamic international law and conventional
international law.
It is worthwhile to mention that assuming the Iranian government was right in
its allegation of espionage against the United States, it could have justifiably
refused to observe the terms of the diplomatic treaties it had with the United States.
The Iranian government's refusal to fulfill the terms of such treaties would have
been well supported by the Qur'anic verse that says: "If you [have reason to] fear
from a people betrayal, throw [their treaty] back to them, [putting you] on equal
terms. Indeed, Allah does not like traitors."79
In addition, such refusal would have also received legal justification from
Article 60(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") which
provides that:
A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: .
. . a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations
between itself and the defaulting State.8 0
The Islamic Republic of Iran can only be justified in its action following the
provisions of the foregoing verse of the Qur'an and the VCLT if it had formally
informed the United States government of its intention to withdraw all diplomatic
commitments it had with United States due to the espionage activities of the
United States within the Islamic Republic of Iran. This position has received
approval from the pronouncement of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) when he said that
"[h]e who has entered a treaty must not alter it until the period has expired, or he
should let the other side know of the annulment so that he and they would be on
equal footing."81 The Prophet also added that "[b]ehave not treacherously, even
towards those who are treacherous to you." 82 Hilmi Zawati rightly concluded
when he said that "[i]n committing any prohibited acts, which might disturb the
peace and security of dar al-Islam, like engaging in espionage ... an envoy will be
declared persona non grata and expatriated safely to his state of origin."8 3
It thus appears that the Iranian government did not expressly declare its
intention to sever diplomatic ties with the United States due to the espionage
activities of the United States, which it found to be a gross violation of Article 41
78. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 615.
79. Qur'an 8:58.
80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331.
81. ISLAM HOUSE, KNOW THY PROPHET 33 (2008), available at
http://dl.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih-books/single/en-know_prophet.pdf.
82. ISLAM HOUSE, THE PROPHET'S BIOGRAPHY 186 (2006), available at
http://dl.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih-books/single/en The Biographyof the Prophet.pdf.
83. HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR? WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
ISLAMIC AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2001).
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of the VCDR.84 There is no evidence that such step was taken by the Islamic
Republic of Iran since it did not "employ the remedies placed at its disposal by
diplomatic law specifically for dealing with activities of the kind of which it now
complains."85 Having said this, the Iranian government cannot be justified in their
action towards the United States and, as such, would be held liable to the United
States under Islamic law and international law for invading the United States
embassy and detaining its diplomatic personnel.
IV. VIOLATION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
The protection of diplomatic envoys has been known and practiced since the
ancient times through the present era of modern states.86 We cannot also doubt the
fact that there have been series of cases involving the violation of diplomatic
inviolability ranging from kidnap, arrest and detention, to even killing of
diplomatic personnel. It is, however, doubtful if there is any violation of
diplomatic immunity that can be likened to the taking of the United States embassy
and detaining its diplomatic personnel by Iran as occurred on November 4, 1979.
It is not surprising when Professor Barker makes an unequivocal submission that
"[u]ndoubtedly, the most significant failure to protect diplomats in history
concerned the seizure and subsequent occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran,
Iran, in 1979.,87 The occupation of the United States embassy by the Iranian
demonstrators was described by Adib-Moghaddam as "the most explicit rejection
of international 'norms of appropriate behaviour', and here specifically the
institutions of international law."88  Richard Falk has also alluded to this
submission in 1980 when he said that "Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to honor the
rules of international law relating to diplomatic immunity is among the most
serious charges brought against its leadership. Even Hitler, it is alleged, never
violated the diplomatic immunity of his enemies." 89
It seems clear that the seizure of the United States embassy in Iran could not
have been permissible under the Islamic legal system. If one is to place the Iranian
acts of forceful entry into the United States embassy; the acts of detaining
personnel of the United States embassy; the acts of seizing and searching the
documents and archives of the United States embassy; and the acts of restriction
imposed on the freedom of movement of the United States diplomatic personnel on
the platform of Islamic law, a legal system officially proclaimed to be adopted by
84. Article 41 of the VCDR provides that: "Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities,
it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations
of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State."
VCDR, supra note 2, art. 41.
85. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
87 (May 24).
86. Legault, supra note 16, at 359.
87. J. CRAIG BARKER, THE PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL 8 (2006).
88. ARSHIN ADIB-MOGHADDAM, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF: A
CULTURAL GENEALOGY 25 (2006).
89. Falk, supra note 12, at 411.
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the Islamic Republic of Iran, it will not be a surprise that Iran would have been
held liable were it to be prosecuted under the Islamic legal system. The reason, of
course, is obvious following the view of Professor Bsoul that "Muslim jurists
agreed that the envoys and ambassadors enjoyed the right of immunity, regardless
of their views and the nature of the message they were delivering. Their immunity
continued for as long as they were in the Islamic empire." 90 It is apparent that
under Islamic siyar, diplomatic envoys must not only be respected, but must
actually be protected from all forms of molestation or maltreatment. This principle
of Islamic siyar was further buttressed by Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah that
"[diplomatic] [e]nvoys, along with those who are in their company, enjoy full
personal immunity: they must never be killed, nor be in any way molested or
maltreated."91 Coincidentally, this represents the general position of how the
diplomatic personnel should be treated according to the Shiite school of Islamic
jurisprudence.92 Before discussing the implication of the Iranian acts under
Islamic law, it may be necessary to consider the legal authority of the principles of
diplomatic immunity in Islamic jurisprudence.
A. Legal Authority oflslamic Diplomatic Immunities
The Islamic concept of diplomatic immunity derives its legal authority first
from the Qur'an, which is the primary source of Islamic jurisprudence. The
Prophetic traditions also establish the validity of diplomatic immunities in Islamic
law as indicated by several statements of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). "Likewise,
the practices of the Muslim Caliphs, starting from the period of the first four
caliphs, up to the present Muslim [states] confirm the legitimacy of diplomatic
[immunity]."9 For the purpose of clarity, each of these legal sources will be
briefly considered.
1. Text from the Qur'an
The incident that validates the exchange of emissaries and further confirms
diplomatic immunity is, according to Professor Bassiouni, cited in Qur'an 27:23-
4494 It occurred when Bilqees bint Sharahil, the Queen of Saba',95 in response to
the letter of Prophet Sulayman (992-952 BC), sent emissaries with gifts to be
presented to Prophet Sulayman. 96  Qur'an 27:35 recounts the incident when
Bilqees said: "But indeed, I will send to them a gift and see with what [reply] the
90. Bsoul, supra note 69, at 134.
91. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 74, at 139 (footnote omitted).
92. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 618.
93. M.B.A. Ismail, Justifications and Principles of Diplomatic Immunity: A Comparison between
Islamic International Law and International Law, J. ISLAMIC PRAC. INT'L L., Issue 1 2013, at 60, 75
[hereinafter Ismail, Justifications and Principles ofDiplomatic Immunity].
94. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 610.
95. Saba' is also known as Himyar and according to Ibn Katheer, it was a dynasty in Yemen. See
ABu AL-FIDA ISMAIL IBN KATHIR, 7 TAFsIR IBN KHATIR 314 (Shaykh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri
ed., 2d ed. 2003).
96. See Qur'an 27:22-35.
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messengers will return."9 "While declining the gifts which were considered as a
sort of bribery, Prophet Sulayman restrained himself from visiting his annoyance .
. . on the envoys, because he understood the importance of their personal
inviolability."98 Prophet Sulayman then sent the emissaries of Bilqees back with
their gifts saying: "Do you provide me with wealth? But what Allah has given me
is better than what He has given you. . . . Return to them . . . ."9 There is no
doubt that Prophet Sulayman had the power of detaining and punishing the
emissaries of Bilqees for their offense, but rather he chose to let them go, believing
that it is sacrilegious to harm or detain the envoys of another sovereign.
2. The Sunnah
The Sunnah has established the fundamental principles of privileges and
immunities that are granted to diplomatic envoys under Islamic styar in numerous
places. 'oo This is as a result of the exchange of diplomatic envoys between Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) and other nations. History has it that Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) sent different emissaries to various places including Makkah, Byzantium,
Egypt, Persia, and Ethiopia either for religious or political reasons. 101 He equally
warmly received delegations and embassies in his mosque at a place designated as
ustuwanat al-wuffid (the pillar of embassies).102 He so much held the respect and
inviolability accorded foreign ambassadors in high esteem to the extent that while
he was on his deathbed he was reported to have instructed his successor to award
gifts to envoys as he himself used to do during his lifetime.103 Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) was known to be very kind towards his guests to the extent that he attached
the string of belief in Allah and the Last Day to the kind treatment of guests by
saying that: "Who[ever] believes in Allah and the Last Day, should serve his guest
generously."'0 Meaning that, as a Muslim, you are required to be hospitable to
your guest, be that person a Muslim or non-Muslim.
3. Consistent Practice of Muslim Heads of State
Flowing from the two divine sources, the generality of the Muslim heads of
states (the Caliphs, Sultans, and the current heads of the Muslim countries) also
establish diplomatic immunity through their international transactions. ' Just like
in the time of Prophet Muhammad, the era of his foremost successors, generally
referred to as the rightly guided caliphs, also recorded some diplomatic relations
97. Qur'an 27:35.
98. Ismail, Justifications and Principles of Diplomatic Immunity, supra note 93, at 75.
99. Qur'an 27:36-37.
100. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 613.
101. See MAJD KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 241 (1955). See also Bsoul,
supra note 69, at 130.
102. ZAWATI, supra note 83, at 77.
103. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 74, at 138.
104. ISLAMIC HADITH: ENGLISH TRANSLATION 18.156 (Kaitlyn Chick trans., 2013).
105. Bsoul, supra note 69, at 134-36.
32 VOL. 42:1
IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS FROM ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE
with foreign potentates.106 In strict adherence to the teachings of Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh), Abu-Bakr (d. AD 634), the first Caliph after Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh), was reported to have instructed Yazid Ibn Abu Sufyan (d. AD
640), when the later was leading an expedition to Syria, in the following words: "in
case envoys of the adversary come to you, treat them with hospitality."10 7 This era
witnessed tremendous exchange of envoys between the Muslims and non-Muslim
states. For instance, in AD 651 a diplomatic mission headed by Sa'd bin Abi
Waqqas was sent to the Chinese Emperor, Gaozong of Tang, under the overall
leadership of Uthman Ibn 'Affan, the third Caliph.os
The diplomatic intercourse of the then Islamic empire with neighboring
kingdoms, according to Hilmi Zawati, attained the height of sophistication during
the period of the Umayyad and especially during the era of the Abbasid dynasty. 109
The large amount of peace treaties conclusively negotiated with other kingdoms at
that time attest to the diplomatic successes achieved by these early Muslim
states.' 10 The period of the Abbasid has been acknowledged to have expanded, in
no small magnitude, the ambit of the international connections the Islamic State
had with other nations, especially in the area of commerce."' No wonder the
foreign relations of the Abbasid Caliphate have been identified and greatly
applauded for being a monumental factor upon which rest the enormous power,
glory, and progress recorded by the caliphate.112
It is no surprise, therefore, that the generality of the Muslim states under the
auspices of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation came together to recognize the
inviolability and immunities of the diplomatic personnel of individual state
members." 3 They did this in addition to becoming parties to the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.114 Thus, Islamic law recognizes and observes certain immunities and
privileges when dealing with diplomatic envoys.
B. Implication ofIran's Contravention ofDiplomatic Immunity Under
Islamic Siyar
The historical narration of the incidence between Prophet Sulayman and
Bilqees (the Queen of Saba') contained in the Qur'an is quite instructive in this
regard." 5 The decision of Prophet Sulayman to send the emissaries of Bilqees
106. ZAWATI, supra note 83, at 78.
107. Ismail, Islamic Diplomatic Law and International Diplomatic Law, supra note 54, at 88.
108. See JONATHAN N. LIPMAN, FAMILIAR STRANGERS: A HISTORY OF MUSLIMS IN NORTHWEST
CHINA 25, 29 (1997).
109. ZAWATI, supra note 83, at 78.
110. See id.
111. SEN, supra note 9, at 5.
112. See PHILIP K. HITri, MAKERS OF ARAB HISTORY 82 (1968).
113. Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference,
May 15, 1976, O.I.C. Doc. IS/CM/D.20/FINAL, available at
http://www.oicun.org/uploads/files/convenion/AGREEMENT%/200N%20IMMUNITIES%2En.pdf.
114. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 613.
115. Id. at 610.
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back along with their gifts, which were considered as bribery and an insult to his
personality, exhibited the kind of respect he had for foreign messengers.1 16 He
declared them as persona non grata. Hence, the Qur'anic narration, according to
Professor Bassiouni, signifies that "the emissaries were immune from the wrath of
the host state and were not held responsible for the acts or messages sent by their
head of state." 1 7 He further concludes that "expulsion is the only sanction to be
taken against them."'" Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran would have acted
within the confines of Islamic international law by expelling the diplomatic
personnel of the United States or closing down the entire diplomatic mission of the
United States on the ground of espionage following the example of Prophet
Sulayman in the Qur'an.
The Prophetic traditions further elaborated the Qur'anic injunctions regarding
the way diplomatic envoys should be treated. One incidence was the case of the
two emissaries sent to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) by Musaylimah, who also
claimed to be a prophet of God.11 9 In spite of the annoying message the envoys of
Musaylimah brought to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which could have led to their
incarceration or even execution, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said to them: "By
[Allah], were it not that messengers are not to be [slain], I would behead the both
of you!" 20 He uttered those words in recognition of the fact that the two envoys of
Musaylimah were considered ordinary means of diplomatic communication, and as
such possessed diplomatic immunity. Also relevant in this context is the case of
Wahshi, the one who murdered Hamzah, the uncle of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh),
in the battle of Uhud. 121 He was accorded diplomatic immunity when he visited
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as an ambassador of the people of Taif.122  The
generous reception that Wahshi received from Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) led to
his acceptance of Islam.123 In the words of Saif, "[t]he Prophet, stressing the
diplomatic immunity of ambassadors, did not hold their earlier antagonism against
them," but instead he cheerfully received and welcomed them into the newly found
faith of Islam.124
116. See Qur'an 27:35-37.
117. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 610.
118. Id. at 610-11.
119. BASSIOUNI, SHARI'A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 187-88. His full name
was Musaylimah ibn Habib. Id. He was one of those who laid false claim to prophethood almost around
the same time with Prophet Muhammad. Id. He was given the nickname "al-kadhdhab" (the liar) by
Prophet Muhammad. See id.
120. Id.
121. The Battle of Uhud, AL-ISLAM, http://www.al-islam.org/restatement-history-islam-and-
muslims-sayyid-ali-ashgar-razwy/battle-uhud (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). This is the second major battle
Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims fought against the Makkans in AD 625. Id.
122. See Sahih Bukhari Volume 005, Book 059, Hadith Number 399, HADITH COLLECTION,
http://hadithcollection.com/sahihbukhari/92/5656-sahih-bukhari-volume-005-book-059-hadith-number-
399.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
123. See id.
124. Ahmed Abdelkareem Saif, Taif, in CITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A
HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 342, 343 (Michael R. T. Dumper & Bruce E. Stanley eds., 2007).
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The Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan was correct when it held that Prophet
Muhammad never permitted any [diplomatic] representatives to be maltreated,
"rather he showed them greatest honour and respect and granted immunities to
them inter alia from imprisonment and death, however, hostile was their behaviour
and threatening their language."l25
The detention of foreign envoys was specifically discouraged by Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh).126 It was narrated by Abu Rafi' who was designated as the
Makkans' envoy to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in Madinah immediately after the
battle of Badr, and upon seeing Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Islam was cast into
his heart straight away to the extent that he requested never to return to Makkah.127
The Prophet blatantly rejected his request by saying: "I do not break a covenant or
imprison messengers, but return, and if you feel the same as you do just now, come
back." 28 The request of Abu Rafi' was rejected by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) on
the basis of diplomatic inviolability as he was, then, an ambassador of the
Makkans, he deserved not to be detained in Madinah. Perhaps, if Prophet
Muhammad had acceded to the request of Abu Rafi' by allowing him to remain in
Madinah, it would have amounted to him detaining a Makkan envoy. It was
further reported that Abu Rafi' later came back, not as diplomatic envoy, but as a
Muslim emigrant.129
It is precisely clear from the foregoing authorities in the Qur'an and the
Prophetic traditions that diplomatic envoys must be respected and particularly
protected throughout the duration of their stay within any Muslim state. Moreover,
since the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of "framing the foreign policy of
the country on the basis of Islamic criteria," as specified in its Constitution, 130 it is
also expected that Iran will be totally committed to the principles of diplomatic
immunity as contained under Islamic international law. Islamic international law
imposes a duty on the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide adequate protection
against the invasion and seizure of the United States embassy.
V. COMPARING THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TEHRAN WITH
THE 1979 INVASION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
The November 29, 2011, attack on the British embassy by some angry
demonstrators can be distinguished from the 1979 United States embassy
125. In re Islamisation of Laws Public Notice No. 3 1983, (1985) 37 PLD (FSC) 344, 354 (Pak.);
see also Ismail, Justifications and Principles ofDiplomatic Immunity, supra note 93, at 81.
126. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 74, at 147-48.
127. See Abu Dawud Book 0008, Hadith 2752, HADITH COLLECTION,
http://www.hadithcollection.com/abudawud/240-Abu%2ODawud%20Book%2008.%20Jihad/16836-
abu-dawud-book-008-hadith-number-2752.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. QANUNI AsSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 3(16).
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invasion.' 3 ' The protestors, mostly students, went into the British embassy,
shattering windows, ransacking offices, setting ablaze the embassy vehicle, looting
and damaging embassy properties, and removing and replacing the British flag
with the Iranian flag.132 The demonstration was initially meant to commemorate
the first anniversary of the assassination of a senior Iranian nuclear scientist, Majid
Shahriari.13 3 They eventually stormed the British embassy, mainly to protest the
United Kingdom's decision to cut off all dealings with the Iranian Central Bank in
response to the Iranian nuclear program.' 34
In this particular incidence, the Iranian government quickly condemned the
attack by saying that: "The foreign ministry regrets the protests that led to some
unacceptable behaviours[.] We respect and we are committed to international
regulations on the immunity and safety of diplomats and diplomatic places." 3 5
But then, one would have expected the Iranian government to provide adequate
and special measures to protect the embassy and its personnel before the attacks
took place. Had they done that, Iran would have been vindicated and seen by the
international community to have complied with the terms embedded in the 1961
and 1963 Vienna Conventions as well as upholding the principles of diplomatic
immunity entrenched in Islamic international law. Moreover, it is a fundamental
precept in Islamic law that individuals and states are strictly bound by the terms of
the treaties they made to other individuals and states, be they Muslims or non-
Muslims. 3 6  Allowing the demonstrators to gain access to the premises of the
embassy, in the words of the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, would
amount "to a grave breach of the Vienna Convention which requires the protection
of diplomats and diplomatic premises under all circumstances." 3 7
VI. DOES IRAN HAVE ANY LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR INVADING THE AMERICAN
EMBASSY UNDER ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The Iranian government claimed the invasion of the United States embassy by
the demonstrating students on November 4, 1979, was justified. But then, there is
131. See Robert F. Worth & Rick Gladstone, Iranian Protesters Attack British Embassy, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-storm-
british-embassy.html? r=0.
132. See id.
133. Julian Borger & Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Storming of British Embassy in Tehran Worsens
Bilateral Relations, GuARDIAN, Nov. 29, 2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/201 1/nov/29/british-embassy-attack-iran-uk-relations.
134. See Worth & Gladstone, supra note 131 ("Britain's new economic sanctions require all
contacts to be severed with the Iranian Central Bank, a step that the United States had already taken.").
135. 5:20 PM GMT/12:20 PM EST-Iran Protesters Attack UK Embassy in Tehran-Tuesday 29
November, GUARDLAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/nov/29/iran-protesters-attack-uk-
embassy-tehran-live#block-19 (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
136. See Habachy, supra note 54, at 451-52; see also Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117, 195 (1963).
137. 6:10 PM GMT/1:10 PM EST-Iran Protesters Attack UK Embassy in Tehran-Tuesday 29
November, GUARDLAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/nov/29/iran-protesters-attack-uk-
embassy-tehran-live#block-24 (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
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a need to critically evaluate the Iranian government's justification under Islamic
law. It is also noteworthy that the Iranian government neither put up appearance
nor filed any Counter-Memorial before the I.C.J. Iran never participated in the
entire judicial proceedings, but rather, sent two letters, dated December 9, 1979,
and March 16, 1980, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran to the I.C.J.138
These letters, which were similar in contents, contained the reasons why the
Iranian government felt that "the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of
the case" brought by the United States.139
The December 9, 1979 letter, drew the attention of the Court to the "deep-
rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a
revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters;
any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is a matter essentially and
directly within the national sovereignty of Iran."1 40 As far as the Islamic Republic
of Iran is concerned, the entire question before the I.C.J.
only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem,
one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter
alia, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States
in the affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and
numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and
in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.141
The letter further mentioned that the dispute between the governments of Iran
and the United States is not predicated on "the interpretation and the application of
the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an
overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex
elements."1 42 Therefore, according to Iran, it will be improper for the I.C.J. to
"examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the
whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the
last 25 years."l 43
In addition, the then spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam
Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a decree on November 17, 1979, which may be
considered as an approval and justification for taking over the United States
embassy by saying that: "the American Embassy was 'a centre of espionage and
conspiracy' and that 'those people who hatched plots against our Islamic
movement in that place do not enjoy international diplomatic respects.""4
138. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
1 10 (May 24).
139. Id. See also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 18 (Dec. 15).
140. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. T 8.
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It can be inferred from the above statement that since the United States
embassy had been used as a place to spy on and conspire against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran was then justified to detain its diplomatic and consular staff
and therefore, seize the entire embassy. In a nutshell, one could say that the
Iranian government relied on the following justifications as the basis for its action:
first, a continual interference by the United States in the affairs of Iran and the
numerous crimes committed against the Iranian people for more than 25 years; 145
and second, the use of the United States embassy as a 'centre of espionage and
conspiracy' against the Islamic Republic of Iran.146
Regarding the first justification, there are impressive examples in the Qur'an
and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which made it abundantly clear
that it will amount to violating the immunity of diplomatic envoys if the diplomats
should be subjected to punishment or detention by the host country for any offense
they might have allegedly committed.147 Moreover, the Iranian government never
brought any criminal charges alleging the commission of espionage or any other
offenses against any of the United States diplomats. Rather, the diplomats should
be seen as ordinary means of facilitating diplomatic interactions between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.148
The second justification by the Iranian government is that the United States
government was using its embassy in Iran as a spy nest, which, according to the
Iranian overnment, automatically took away the United States enjoyment of
international diplomatic respects.149 Truly, according to Islamic law of crime,
espionage is an offense, but it does not go to the extent of stripping diplomatic and
consular staff of their immunity. One has to understand that espionage as an
offense belongs to the ta'azir (discretionary) category15 0 of crimes as it is not
categorically considered haram (prohibited) under Islamic criminal law.'' It does
not fall under the hudi~d (determined) 5 2 and qisas (retaliation) offenses.153 As for
145. Id. 10.
146. Id. 73.
147. See JAVAID REHMAN, ISLAMIC STATE PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THREAT
FROM TERRORISM: A CRITIQUE OF THE 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS' IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 119
(2005).
148. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 610.
149. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran, Judgment 1980 I.C.J. 73.
150. These are offenses that are not specifically mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, but the
Islamic penal system empowers the state and the judges to impose punishments on these forbidden acts
which are accordingly designated as ta'azir. See RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 65-66
(2005). By reason of its flexibility, offenses that are most likely to fall under ta'azir have been
considered to be much wider in scope than those of hudad or qisas. See id.
151. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 623-24.
152. These are crimes whose punishment are specified and decreed by the Qur'an and the Sunnah
of the Prophet otherwise known as "uquubaat muqaddarah." See Saeed Hasan Ibrahim, Basic
Principles of Criminal Procedure Under Islamic Sharf'a, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ISLAM: JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE IN THE SHARI'A 17, 18 (Muhammad Abdel Haleem et al. eds., 2003).
153. Unlike hudfid offenses, which are considered to involve the rights of God (huquq-llaah), qisas
offenses also referred to as retaliation concern the rights of man. See Mehran Tamadonfar, Islam, Law,
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the hudiid and qisis offenses, there are fixed penalties for them in the Qur'an and
the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).15 4
It is clear in Islamic law that ta'azir offenses, being discretionary in nature,
could generally be waived, particularly, by diplomatic immunity.'ss In other
words, since espionage is classified as one of the ta'azir offenses, it therefore,
follows that any detention or arrest of internationally protected person for the
commission of espionage will be rendered nugatory. The Iranian government
would have contravened Islamic international law by detaining the United States
diplomats for allegedly committing the offense of espionage. Even if the United
States diplomats were involved in the act of spying in Iran, the most appropriate
action to be taken by the Iranian regime, according to Islamic international law,
would have been to expel them from Iran. This action is also compatible with the
provisions of Article 9(1) of the VCDR which provides that:
The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its
decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any
member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or
that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In
any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the
person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person
may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the
territory of the receiving State. 56
The purported justifications put forward by the Islamic Republic of Iran can,
at best, be described, according to Professor Rehman, as "national, political and
economic grievances," which may not constitute an arguable legal defense under
Islamic siyar and conventional international law.'5 7 For instance, Imam Ayatollah
Khomeini lamented: "What kind of law is this? It permits the U.S. government to
exploit and colonize peoples all over the world for decades. But it does not allow
the extradition of an individual who has staged great massacres in Iran. Can you
call it law?"158  However, this in itself does not provide legal justification for
invading the United States embassy. Professor Rehman further stresses that
although "there was a sense of unfairness, injustice and exploitation perpetuated by
successive United States governments," the relevance of the Iranian claims to
Islamic international law remains very much doubtful.1' Meanwhile, the
and Political Control in Contemporary Iran, 40 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 205, 212 (2001). The
offenses that fall under the qisas are five, namely: (a) murder, (b) voluntary killing, (c) involuntary
killing, (d) intentional physical injury or maiming, and (e) unintentional physical injury or maiming. Id.
See also Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 623-24.
154. Ghaouti Benmelha, Ta'azir Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 211, 212 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).
155. Id. at 212, 222. See also Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 623-24.
156. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 9(1).
157. REHMAN, supra note 147, at 123.
158. An Interview with Khomeini: Harsh Words, in a Soft Voice, About the Shah, Carter and
America, TIME, Jan. 7, 1980, at 26, 27.
159. REHMAN, supra note 147, at 123.
2013 39
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
justifications canvassed by the Iranian government, though not legally viable,
surely indict the international law of its "arbitrariness and one-sidedness," which
call for a critical attention.' 60
VII. CONCLUSION
It can be gleaned from this article that Islamic diplomatic law, in the same
spirit with international diplomatic law, condemns the 1979 seizure of the United
States embassy in Tehran. One may submit therefore, that if Iran were to be
brought before a court that dispenses Islamic law, the judgment would not have
been different from that of the I.C.J., regardless of the fact that Iran officially
follows the Shi'a Imamiyyah sect of Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran has a
duty, under Islamic law, to fulfill all contractual obligations it has entered into with
the United States, provided they are not contradictory to the core objectives of the
shari'ah (maqaasid al-shari'ah). The fact that the United States was accused of
committing the offense of espionage by the Iranians may not hold as justification
for the seizure of the United States embassy. The Islamic Republic of Iran within
the purview of this article is therefore found liable under Islamic law for failing to
discharge its diplomatic commitments to the diplomatic mission and staff of the
United States embassy.
160. Id. at 124.
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